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Abstract. The emergence and survival of cooperation is one of the hardest problems
still open in science. Several factors such as the existence of punishment, repeated
interactions, topological effects and the formation of prestige may all contribute to
explain the counter-intuitive prevalence of cooperation in natural and social systems.
The characteristics of the interaction networks have been also signaled as an element
favoring the persistence of cooperators. Here we consider the invasion dynamics of
cooperative behaviors in complex topologies. The invasion of a heterogeneous network
fully occupied by defectors is performed starting from nodes with a given number of
connections (degree) k0. The system is then evolved within a Prisoner’s Dilemma game
and the outcome is analyzed as a function of k0 and the degree k of the nodes adopting
cooperation. Carried out using both numerical and analytical approaches, our results
show that the invasion proceeds following preferentially a hierarchical order in the
nodes from those with higher degree to those with lower degree. However, the invasion
of cooperation will succeed only when the initial cooperators are numerous enough
to form a cluster from which cooperation can spread. This implies that the initial
condition has to be a suitable equilibrium between high degree and high numerosity.
These findings have potential applications to the problem of promoting pro-social
behaviors in complex networks.
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1. Introduction
How cooperation surges and becomes stable despite the tension introduced by individual
interest is one of the most debated questions across sciences [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
Individual interest implies the search for the own outcome optimization, although it
usually leads to sub-optimal solutions at a community or global scale. Cooperation, on
the contrary, may bring better global results but it requires individuals to relinquish part
of their benefits to others. When the game payoff is attached to fitness in evolutionary
game theory, only individually optimal strategies proliferate and cooperative behaviors
are thus doomed to disappear in a few generations. Such grim expectations are
challenged by the widespread presence of cooperation in human [9, 10, 11, 12, 13] and
animal societies [14, 15, 16, 17]. Furthermore, cooperation is at the basis of multicellular
organisms [18, 19, 20]. All these examples occur despite the presence of strong individual
incentives to default on the group cooperation. There exist, of course, counterexamples
where the non-collaborative strategies dominate such as criminal activity that may be
seen as non-cooperative behavior within human societies, or the loss of growth control
exhibited by cancer cells within biological organisms. The key question of which factors
favor the proliferation and eventual generalization of cooperation thus remains open.
Several mechanisms have been advanced for explaining the persistence of
cooperation. Some of them include various procedures for punishing free riders [21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28], rewarding cooperators [29, 30, 31, 32], or a combination
of both [33, 34, 35, 36], which effectively change the payoff balance. Others consider
repeated interactions and the possible development of prestige [29, 32, 37, 38]. When
the agents have to play many times together, the inclination to cooperate may enhance
if both parts benefit in long term and a trust relation can be built. Even though
this can only be an explanation in some particular contexts, finite size fluctuations
can also lead to the invasion and fixation of a disadvantageous strategy [39]. The
structure of the interaction networks have been also claimed to play a role in increasing
global cooperation levels [5, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. Recent empirical and theoretical results,
however, show that this effect may be in doubt for social systems [10, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49].
Here we take a different perspective. Instead of on a final stationary state, the
focus is set on the invasion process of cooperators in a finite population initially almost
full of defectors. As explained before, different factors may lead to the fixation of
cooperation, but how does this process take place? The question that we address
here is whether the structure of the interaction networks can influence the dynamics
of invasion of the system by cooperative strategies. In particular, while studies about
the probability for cooperators to invade effectively a system or to survive in a hostile
environment have been already accomplished [41, 43, 50, 51], in this work we aim to
understand the precise dynamical process through which the invasion takes place, if and
when it does. For this, we set initially the population in a defection state except for a
few agents, and then checked the evolution of these invaders. The spatial interactions
between elements of the system are modeled by two types of random networks in which
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the nodes are the agents and the interactions links: scale-free (configurational model)
and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi. The invasion process is analyzed as a function of the degree of the
initial cooperative nodes. The strategic interactions between agents are modeled by a
Prisoner’s Dilemma, arguably one the most extensively studied game-theoretical models
of human cooperation [50, 51, 52, 53]. In this work we do not add further ingredients
to the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, as for instance sanctioning defectors by
cooperators [54, 55, 56], reputation [57], or emotions and complex internal dynamics of
agents [58, 59, 60], because here we aim to single out the network effects on the invasion
process; we only vary the update algorithm, as we explain in the following, in order to
test the robustness of the results we found. We find numerically and analytically that,
in this context, the invasion of cooperation follows a clear pathway passing from nodes
with high to those with low degrees. This mechanism strongly mediates the invasion
process and its final outcome.
2. The model
We consider a system constituted by N agents occupying the nodes of a given network.
Each agent interacts directly only with her nearest neighbors, and can adopt two possible
strategies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). The interactions are given by a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, in which nodes play with their neighbors and collect a payoff according
to the action adopted by themselves and their opponents. Payoffs are collected according
to the following matrix [61]:
Pˆ =
C D
C 1 0
D 1.4 ε
, (1)
where the punishment parameter ε must fall in the interval [0, 1). Among all the possible
and equivalent shapes, we have chosen this kind of payoff matrix because it allows
us to explore what happens in all the (weak) Prisoner’s Dilemma range: referring to
the classical parametrization [3, 53], we set T = 1.4 (temptation), R = 1 (reward),
P = ε (punishment) and S = 0 (sucker’s payoff); the chosen value of T , already used
in literature [61], has the advantage that is larger than the difference P − S, so that a
defector gains more fitness with respect to the opponent when plays against a cooperator
than another defector. More precisely, the dynamics takes place as follows: at each
elementary time step an agent i, picked up at random, plays a round of the game
with her neighbors. After this, each of her neighbors play a round of the game with
their neighbors. Subsequently, the agent i imitates the strategy of the most successful
neighbor provided that her own payoff is lower. Otherwise, nothing happens. This way
of updating the strategies is the so-called Unconditional Imitation (UI) rule [53, 62, 63]
and it ensures that the most successful strategy rapidly spreads across the population.
After that, the payoff of the players is set to zero, so that every evolution act takes
Hierarchical invasion of cooperation in complex networks 4
1 4 16 64
k
0
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
n
c
'
N = 500
N = 1000
N = 2000
N = 4000
N = 8000
b)
1 4 16 64
k
0
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
n
c
'
¡
¡
¡
¡
c)
2 4 8 16 32
k
0
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
n
c
'
¡
¡
¡
¡
a)
Figure 1. Final cooperator density as a function of the invasion degree k0 for a system
on a scale free network. In a), exponent β = 1.6, sizeN = 1000 and four different values
of the punishment; In b), exponent β = 1.6, ε = 0.05, and five different system sizes;
In c), exponent β = 2.7, size N = 1000 and four different values of the punishment.
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place only on the basis of the last round of the game. A time unit is made up by N
elementary steps of the dynamics (Monte Carlo steps). We stress the fact that at each
round the fitness of a player is the simple sum of the payoffs she has collected with
all her neighbors, without any normalization with respect to her degree: this choice,
which is largely present in literature [51, 52, 53, 64, 65], is actually realistic, since in
nature and human communities having more interactions with peers entails generally
higher fitness, being actually a possible mechanism enhancing cooperation; indeed, in
real situations the agents (be they humans or not) do not compute an average, but act
according to their actual fitness, since it is usually very hard in human societies, and
practically impossible in nature, to get reliable information about the fitness gained by
others [18, 53, 66]. Nevertheless, for sake of completeness, in Sec. 3.4 we will consider
the case where the payoff collected by a player is divided by her degree.
Even though there are many possible game-theoretical models useful for describing
cooperation phenomena, we consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game for two main reasons:
firstly, out of the possible two-player games the conflict between the individual and
group utilities is the greatest [52, 53], so the mechanisms which foster cooperation
can be efficiently identified. On the other hand, the dynamics of this model has been
extensively studied in the literature [50, 51, 53]. This sets a baseline against which we
can compare our results; moreover, it opens the door to the analysis of the effects of
the update rule in the invasion process, given that the update rules and their impact
on the final outcome have already been deeply studied in the context of the Prisoner’s
dilemma.
Contrariwise, the use of the update rule is delicate because under some conditions
different rules may yield diverging results, so that it is always important to check if
the results are robust by changing the evolution algorithm and inserting stochasticity
in it [53]. In this case, we select UI as the first option for the sake of simplicity but we
have checked that the same invasion patterns are observed with other updating rules.
In particular, we have used the replicator (REP) update, in which after each game
round the evolving individual i imitates the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor
with probability proportional to the payoff difference between them provided that the
neighbor’s payoff is higher than i’s [67, 68, 69]. Besides UI and REP updates, we have
also explored more realistic rules such as the so-called moody cooperation inspired by
the findings in experimental settings [48, 70]. In this rule the probability of modifying
a strategy depends on the success or not of the last game round and on the previous
strategy of the agent. In all cases, we have found similar results in the direction of the
invasion (top-down) and in the characteristics that initial invaders should have so that
the invasion may succeed (high degree and numerosity).
Networks - In this work we tested the behavior of the model in different topologies.
In particular, we utilized Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) [71] and Scale Free (SF) random networks
generated by the Molloy-Reed algorithm [72]. The main difference between these types
of random networks is the heterogeneity in the number of nodes’ connections (degree,
k). In the case of ER graphs the degree distribution is Poissonian with a given average
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Figure 2. Final cooperator density as a function of the invasion degree k0 for a
system on an ER network in a) with average degree 〈k〉 = 3.5, size N = 1000) and two
different values of the punishment. In b), the same results on a scale free network with
exponent β = 5.6 and size N = 1000), and two different values of the punishment.
degree 〈k〉, while in the Molloy-Reed networks it decays as a power-law with an exponent
β (P (k) ∼ k−β). As a consequence, the number of high degree nodes is much larger in
the SF than in ER networks.
Initial conditions - Since our aim is to study if and how cooperation invade a
system of interacting individuals, we consider systems where initially all the agents are
defectors, apart from the ones occupying nodes of a given degree k0. In this case, we
consider two options: either all the agents in nodes with k0 are initially cooperators or,
in Sec. 3.3, only a certain fixed number of nodes with degree k0, N
0
c , selected at random
are cooperators, the rest are defectors. The results were obtained exploring different
values of k0.
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Figure 3. Values of ratio between the final cooperator density n∞c over the initial one
n0c as a function of the invasion degree k0 for systems of size N = 1000 and ε = 0.05
on different networks. There has been invasion for the points above the tilted line.
3. Numerical results
3.1. Final state of the system
We begin the description of the results by analyzing the final configuration of the system
using numerical simulations and as a function of the invasion degree k0 for different
values of the remaining parameters. If not explicitly specified, the system size is set at
N = 1000, although several system sizes have been explored. The results are always
averaged over 2000 independent realizations.
The final value of the cooperator density n∞c is displayed as a function of k0 for the
invasion of a SF network with N = 1000 agents and β = 1.6 (that is, a heterogeneous
network), and for increasing values of the punishment ε is shown in Figure 1a. All
the nodes with degree k0 are set as cooperators at t = 0. Then the system is evolved
until no more changes are observed in the density of cooperators. Interestingly, in the
range of low values of k0, n
∞
c decreases until it reaches a minimum n
min
c , after which it
increases and tends to a maximum value nmaxc for a very high k0. This means that the
chances of cooperators to invade the network strictly depend on k0. Given the shape of
the degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−β, the number of nodes with low degree is higher and
a competition effect appears between adding more initial cooperators when k0 is small
and the efficiency of the nodes to propagate the cooperative behavior, which seems to be
stronger at higher k0 values. This explains the initial decay of n
∞
c and its ulterior strong
increase. Different parameters ε produce some changes in the level of final fraction of
cooperators n∞c . However, the curves of n
∞
c (k0) follow the same qualitative behavior.
When the size of the system is varied for a fixed ε, the picture emerging is similar.
In Figure 1b, n∞c is depicted as a function of k0 for ε = 0.05. The invasion from nodes
of degree k0 = 2 have a low ratio of success, which increases to values of the order of
one if the initial cooperative nodes are the hubs. The intermediate k0 values lead to a
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Figure 4. Histograms of the frequency of transitions from defection to cooperation
as a function of the ratio ki/kf , being kf the degree of the agent which flipped from
defection to cooperation by imitating the agent with degree ki, for a system on a scale
free network (exponent β = 1.6 and size N = 2000, ε = 0.05 and k0 = 30), in case of a)
UI evolution rule, and b) REP updating. The cumulative frequency of the transitions
with degree ratio larger than one (i.e. the top-down invasion acts) is ≃ 98% for UI
and ≃ 69% for REP.
very small n∞c , which becomes smaller and smaller as the system size increases.
Similar results are obtained with a less heterogeneous network (β = 2.7), as shown
in Figure 1c: the only difference is that after reaching a maximum, nmaxc tends to vanish
for k0 → ∞ due to the scarcity of hubs. In the extreme situation, the scenario is
modified if we consider almost homogeneous networks as can be seen in Figure 2a. We
show again the behavior of n∞c as a function of k0 for different values of ε, but on an ER
network with average degree 〈k〉 = 3.5. In this case, we see a much simpler behavior:
the final cooperation level is always very low, and rapidly decreases with increasing k0.
The same behavior can be observed on a SF network but with β = 5.6, that is, a network
much closer to a homogeneous one than a SF with β < 3.
In all the configurations that we have investigated the final cooperation level never
reaches the unit density, so that cooperative behaviors are not able to completely invade
the network. Furthermore, the resulting n∞c is averaged over thousands of realizations.
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Figure 5. Values of ratio between the final cooperator density n∞c over the initial
one nic as a function of the invasion degree k0 for systems of size N = 4000 on an
SF network (exponent β = 1.6), ε = 0.05 and different number of initial invaders; the
lacking points for small invasion degrees are values of k0 for which cooperators end
up totally wiped out; the violet straight line represents a power law with exponent 4.
There has been invasion for the points above the tilted line.
In some of them the population of cooperators may have extinguished, providing n∞c
a clue of the probability of persistence of cooperators at t → ∞. When the invasion
properly occurs, the final density of cooperators must grow respect to the initial one.
This is why we will talk about a proper invasion when the ratio between the final
cooperator density and the initial one is larger than 1. Figure 3 shows this ratio n∞c /n
0
c
as a function of the degree k0 for different types of networks. According to these results,
a high degree heterogeneity in the network is necessary for cooperative behaviors to
invade (we only see it if β < 3). Not only that, it is also required that k0 is over a
certain value for cooperation to spread.
3.2. Direction of the invasion process
An important question is through which modality the invasion process takes place (when
it does). In particular, when a defector imitates a cooperator, i.e. a site is invaded by
cooperation, it is rather relevant to know if the invaded node has a higher degree than
the invader or not. Figure 4a shows that a single invasion act is more likely to happen
top-down than bottom-up, that is, there is a statistical bias that favors configurations
with the invaded node having lower degree than the invading one. The distribution of
the ratios between the degree of the initial cooperative node ki and that of the node
adopting cooperation kf is shown in Figure 4a. The first bin, between zero and one,
encloses all the instances when kf ≥ ki. As can be seen, this is a much smaller fraction of
all the invasion processes registered, and this happens also with a different update rule,
as shown in Figure 4b. In principle, this result could be a consequence of the friendship
paradox [73]. Anyway, if we compute the average degree ratio rd = 〈kn/k〉 (being kn
the general neighbor’s degree) for the network utilized in Figure 4 (Molloy-Reed scale
Hierarchical invasion of cooperation in complex networks 10
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Figure 6. Cooperator density n∞c in the last mixed configuration over n
i
c as a function
of the invasion degree k0 for systems of size N = 4000 on an SF network (exponent
β = 1.6), ε = 0.05 and different number of initial invaders. This stage is always with
just one contrarian which will be reabsorbed at the next step of the dynamics.
free network with N = 2000 nodes and exponent β = 1.6), it results rd ≃ 1.59, whilst
the average ratio between the invader degree and the invaded one is around 7 for the
UI dynamics and 5.8 for the REP rule.
3.3. Fixed number of initial invaders
In order to better understand the mechanisms of the invasion, we also performed
some simulations setting at the initial stage of the dynamics only defectors, apart N0c
cooperators on nodes of degree k0. Naturally, for small values of k0 the network has
always at least N0c nodes of such degree, whilst for large k0 we have kept only realizations
of the network having the number of nodes needed. This choice allows us to better
understand the mechanisms underlying the observed dynamics. In Figure 5, we see that
if the invasion does not take place (that is, if the final cooperator density is not larger
than the initial one), then the cooperator density is generally vanishing. This is even
more understandable watching Figure 6, where we show the average cooperator density
in the last stage where both strategies are still present in the system. As it can be easily
noticed, with fixed number of invaders the final configuration is always all-cooperators
or all-defectors, while setting initially all the nodes of grade k0 with invaders entails the
possibility of a final mixed state. As the reader can notice, for these simulations we
utilized larger networks, so that the systems can have more nodes with larger degrees
than in the previous case, magnifying strength and weakness of high degree invaders.
Such results reinforce the previous considerations: the outcome of the dynamics
depends on the combined effect of the degree of the initial invaders and their quantity:
without fixed number of initial cooperators (baseline model configuration), increasing
k0 is helpful for the invaders because it increases their influence towards the rest of the
system, but, at the same time, reduces their number weakening the enhancing effect of
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a higher degree. Therefore, if we set N0c , for small k0, we have generally less invaders
with respect to the baseline (all the nodes of degree k0 cooperators at t = 0), whilst
for high values of k0 we have even more invaders than in the baseline: in practice,
if in the previous case we have always two competing effects (a lot of invaders with
little connectivity in one case, few invaders with big connectivity in the second one), by
setting N0c we have in both cases two adding up effects (few, weak invaders for small
k0, and many, powerful invaders for large k0). To be even clearer, let us suppose that
for a given high value of k0 the average number of nodes with such degree be two: in
this case, only two initial invaders have a very low probability to survive, but if we
require to have 5 or 6 of them, selecting only the few iterations where the network has
generated them, we will have a bunch of invaders with high degree and, consequently,
very high probability to form a cluster able to completely invade the system, as we will
show also in Sec. 4. As a result, there is always a complete invasion of cooperators (for
large k0), or a total extinction (for small k0). In short, we can conclude that in order to
allow the cooperation to spread throughout the system, it is important that the initial
cooperators are located on nodes of degree large enough to permit the initial cooperative
cluster have many links, but not too large to reduce excessively the number of nodes in
such cluster and the connections among themselves.
3.4. Average Payoff
In this section we aim to evaluate how changing the way agents collect their payoff
affects the behavior of the model. In particular, as we anticipated in Sec. 2, we consider
the case in which the payoff collected at each round by an agent is divided by her degree,
that is, the fitness is given by the average payoff per neighbor instead that by the total
payoff. As illustrated in Fig. 7, here the behavior of the model is deeply different from
the one previously observed. In particular, we see that the cooperation survives only for
very low invasion degrees, then vanishes exponentially fast as k0 increases. Moreover,
the few transitions from defection to cooperation prefer clearly the bottom-up direction,
differently from the baseline case. In practice, averaging the payoff over the neighbors
makes higher degree nodes lose their importance as will be discussed in the final section.
3.5. Moody conditional cooperation updates
Up to now, we have shown that the spreading of cooperation is more likely to take
place from higher-degree towards lower-degree nodes, setting a preferential direction for
the invasion process. We verified this outcome with UI and REP evolution algorithms,
but we may also wonder if this effect is more general, and can be detected even when
the elementary dynamics is deeply different. In practice, we want to establish if the
mechanisms at work in a considerably different model drive the system to the same
result. Let us consider, for example, the Moody Conditional Cooperation (MCC)
dynamics [45]. The moody conditional cooperation was proposed as a probabilistic
update rule to explain the decision patterns observed among individuals playing a
Hierarchical invasion of cooperation in complex networks 12
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Figure 7. a) Final cooperator density as a function of the invasion degree k0 for a
system of N = 1000 agents on a scale free network with β = 1.6, ε = 0.05; fitness given
by the average payoff per neighbor (black), and by the total payoff collected (red, same
curve shown in Fig. 1a). b Histogram of the frequency of transitions from defection to
cooperation as a function of the ratio ki/kf , for the same system of left panel (average
payoff) and k0 = 4; notice the logarithmic y-scale.
Prisoner’s Dilemma in a large-scale experiment. It is, therefore, closer to real human
decision making. The main feature of moody cooperation is not the evolution algorithm,
but the definition itself of the strategies for each player. In the model as defined in Sec. 2,
the strategy of an individual is in every moment univocally determined, so that when
involved in a game round, her action is already determined. On the contrary, with
MCC the action of the players depends on the number of cooperating neighbors they
had in the previous round: the more neighbors cooperated, the more likely it is that the
player cooperates. However, the choice depends also on player’s own previous action:
thus, it has been shown that cooperation following cooperation is much more likely than
following defection [48, 70].
We implemented the Moody Conditional Cooperation dynamics as follows. The
probability Pc to cooperate of an individual is
PC =


pX + r if cooperated in the previous round
q if defected in the previous round,
(2)
where X is the fraction of cooperating neighbors in the previous interaction, and
p, q, r ∈ [0, 1] are the quantities defining the individual’s behavior: in practice the set
{pi, qi, ri} defines the (complex) strategy of the player i (of course, if it is pX + r > 1,
the probability PC is set equal to 1). After the interaction, that is, after i and her
neighbors have played a game round, each one with her own neighbors, the strategy
evolves according the UI rule: if at least one neighbor earned more than herself, i will
imitate the best performing one, that is, she will adopt the set {p, q, r} of the fittest
neighbor. The strategy parameters are initially distributed at random, and at the first
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Figure 8. System on a SF network N = 1000, β = 1.6 with Moody Conditional
Cooperation dynamics. In a), time behavior of the cooperator density for different
values of the initial invasion degree. In b), histogram of the frequency of transitions
from defection to cooperation as a function of the ratio ki/kf . The cumulative
frequency of the transitions with degree ratio larger than one is ≃ 85%. Considering
an ER network leads to very similar results.
interaction every player is considered as a previous defector, apart those occupying nodes
of degree k0, which are defined as cooperators.
The Moody Conditional Cooperation dynamics is well known to be little influenced
by the topology of the network [70] (we found this same behavior in this case), and
proved to be more realistic [45], as it was observed in experiments with human subjects.
Besides, since players’ strategy is not a defined action (cooperation or defection), but a
mixed complex one, it is quite hard to define completely an invasion process. However,
it is always possible to study the time evolution of the cooperator density (i.e., the
fraction of cooperating actions per unit time). Moreover, if we consider an agent which
cooperates after having defected at the previous game round, and consider the ratio
between the degree of the neighbor she imitated (when the change of action is the actual
consequence of a change of strategy) and her own degree, we can draw an histogram as
those in Figure 4.
Here we resume the main results for the Moody Conditional Cooperation dynamics
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in Figure 8. First of all, the final outcome of the evolution is independent from k0, since
in this case also the defectors with no cooperating neighbors have a finite probability
to flip action to cooperation. Secondly, considering the transitions from defection to
cooperation, when induced by a strategy imitation, we see that also in this case the
vast majority of such transitions take place from higher to lower degrees. Finally, we
stress the fact that changing the type of network in this case does not change the results
obtained with the SF network utilized in Figure 8. These results allow us to conclude
that, also with a totally different dynamics, cooperative behaviors, in a population of
individuals interacting as in Prisoner’s Dilemma, spread essentially from higher to lower
degree nodes (when they do). This means that this kind of process is very general and
does not depend strictly on the details of the model, but is quite universal. In fact,
since in the Prisoner’s Dilemma cooperation is at individual level a disadvantageous
behavior, cooperators with higher degree, which in complex networks are also likely to
be directly connected, can sustain more easily their pro-social strategy, and therefore
contribute efficiently to the invasion of less connected agents.
4. Analytical discussion
In order to shed light on the fundamental mechanisms which give origin to the
phenomenology presented in the previous sections, we have to analyze the actual effect
of the topology on the dynamics. In order to do that, in this section we proceed in
two ways. First, we will try to apply to our model a peculiar mean-field approach
for networks already utilized in literature for the study of reaction-diffusion processes.
Afterwards, to overcome the limits of such treatment, we will consider more qualitatively
the effect of the spatial fluctuations through the network on the model dynamics.
4.1. Heterogeneous mean-field
A possible way ahead could be to study the time evolution of the partial cooperator
densities nkc (t) (that is, the fraction of cooperators occupying nodes of degree k),
following an already developed approach utilized for reaction-diffusion processes on
heterogeneous networks [74]. We start by defining the single node occupation number
nti in this way: ν
t
i = 1 if a cooperator occupies the site i at time t, ν
t
i = 0 if instead the
node i is occupied by a defector. Its evolution rule is
νt+1i = ν
t
i ηi + (1− νti ) ξi, (3)
where ηi and ξi are quantities given by
ηi =


0 with probability λi
1 with probability 1− λi
(4)
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and
ξi =


0 with probability 1− µi
1 with probability µi ,
(5)
being λi (µi) the probability that a cooperator (defector) in node i becomes a defector
(cooperator) after time t (for simplicity, we keep implicit their time dependence). It is
easy at this point to compute the average over the ensemble:
〈νt+1i 〉 = 〈νti 〉+ µi − (λi + µi)〈νti 〉 , (6)
which, passing to continuous time and defining nic(t) ≡ 〈νti〉, becomes
n˙ic = µi − (λi + µi)nic(t) . (7)
Assuming that the nodes of the same degree are statistically equivalent (uncorrelated
network), Equation (7) can be rewritten as
n˙kc = µk − (λk + µk)nkc (t) , (8)
where, naturally, the index k refers to all the agents occupying vertices of degree k.
Now, evaluating the factors λk and µk is very hard: as pointed out at the beginning of
this section, the probability for an agent to switch strategy depends on the distribution
of cooperators among the nearest neighbors and next nearest neighbors, with the spatial
fluctuation playing a fundamental role. Nevertheless, we can deduce that initially
the partial cooperator densities have to increase for k 6= k0, whilst nk=k0c decreases.
Indeed, initially we have by construction nkc (t) ≃ δk,k0, so that at the early stages of the
dynamics, up to some time t∗, it must be
n˙kc (t . t
∗) ≃


µk > 0 k 6= k0
−λk0 < 0 k = k0 ,
(9)
giving back that, during the initial phase of the evolution, the cooperator density limited
to the nodes of degree k0 has necessarily to decrease, whilst it increases in the remaining
nodes.
The behavior determined by Eq. (9) is actually confirmed by simulations (see
Figure 9), but it is not very informative (especially for what concerns the k0-nodes,
which initially are all cooperators). Therefore, in order to get more effective information
from Equation (8), we should determine the explicit shape of the factors λk and µk,
which unfortunately is very hard. More precisely, applying this heterogeneous mean-field
approach to our model shows two critical points. First of all, mean-field is rigorously
valid in the thermodynamic limit (infinite system size) which has no meaning with
heterogeneous networks where the average degree diverges with N increasing: this means
that Equation (9) represents correctly the model behavior only at the early stages of
the dynamics, after which the finite size effects are no longer negligible. Secondly, the
spatial fluctuations are crucial for the outcome of the dynamics. It is well known indeed
that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game cooperators survive in highly connected clusters
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Figure 9. Time behavior of the partial cooperator densities nkc for two different
topologies. In a), scale-free network (exponent β = 1.6 and size N = 1000, ε = 0.05
and k0 = 5); the curves shown are for k from 2 to 12 (the partial density for k = k0 is
explicitly indicated). In b), ER network (average degree 〈k〉 = 3.5 and size N = 1000),
ε = 0.05, k0 = 5, and some values of k.
where they can take advantage of mutual cooperation [52]: that is, cooperation will
spread starting from a bunch of original cooperators of degree k0 accidentally connected
among themselves. Therefore, in order to describe completely the entire dynamics, we
have to look more in depth at the topological properties of the network.
4.2. Initial clusterization effects
For what stated above, we should expect that the invasion of the cooperation is more
effective when starting from nodes of higher degree, but also numerous enough to create
an initial cluster of connected cooperators from which the spreading can originate. In
order to find out the strength of the invasion as a function of k0, we have to evaluate
the probability to have in a given network a cluster of nodes of the same degree k′
connected among themselves. To this aim, let us start from the conditional probability
P (k′|k) that a node of degree k′ is connected with a node of degree k. In the case of
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uncorrelated networks, we can assume that [75]
P (k′|k) = k
′P (k′)
〈k〉 . (10)
From the previous equation it is possible to assess the average number Nk0 of neighbors
of a node of degree k0 with the same degree:
Nk0 = k0P (k0|k0) =
k20P (k0)
〈k〉 , (11)
which for a SF network is
Nk0 ∝ k2−β0 . (12)
We remind here that the Molloy-Reed algorithm we used to generate our SF networks
does not allow nodes of degree larger than
√
N , so that Equation (12) can be considered
valid for every node. Interestingly, Nk0 is an increasing function of k0 for β < 2, implying
that the higher is the invasion degree, the bigger is the initial cooperator cluster and
the final number of cooperators, as confirmed by Figure 1. The initial decrease for small
values of k0 is a finite size effect, as demonstrated in Figure 1b: in the limit of very high
N , the final partial densities appear to behave as
nkc (t→∞) =


0 if k ≤ k∗
F(k; k0, N) if k > k∗,
(13)
where F(k; k0, N) is an increasing function of k (dependent also on the parameters k0
and N).
On the other hand, for β > 2 the size of the initial cooperator cluster decreases with
k0, so that the invasion probability must vanish for k0 →∞, as confirmed in Figure 1b,
even though for 2 < β < 3 there is an interval of intermediate values of k0 where the
balance between the initial degree of cooperators and the size of the invading cluster is
still favorable for the spreading of cooperation (this region disappears for larger values
of β, as shown in Figure 1b).
Conversely, for an ER random network, it is easy to understand that Equation (12)
reads
Nk0 ∝ k20 e−γ k0 , (14)
where γ > 0. Therefore, Nk0 decays very rapidly with k0, causing the sharp decay of
the invasion probability, in its turn confirmed in Figure 2a. Such result could have been
also predicted simply considering that the average number of sites of higher degree is
very small in this kind of networks, so that there are initially too few cooperators to
form a cluster.
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5. Conclusions and perspectives
In this paper we have studied the mechanisms through which cooperative strategies,
which are disadvantageous for individuals though convenient for the population at a
global level, can invade an initially hostile environment. The main result we have
obtained is that two factors decide if the initial invaders can succeed: they have to be
numerous enough to create a safe cluster from where the invasion can spread, but also
have enough connections with the other individuals. In fact, on complex networks, if
we put the initial invaders only on nodes of the same grade k0, the first requirement
(high connectivity) is satisfied for large k0, whilst the second one (high numerosity) is
satisfied at small k0. This means that, in order to have a final configuration favorable
to cooperation, the initial condition must be a suitable equilibrium between high
degree and high numerosity, which takes place, when possible, at intermediate values
of k0. More interestingly, our results demonstrate also that the invasion process, when
actually works, is a top-down phenomenon, that is, the cooperators occupy more often
nodes of lower degree than the starting ones. This is a rather strong result, since we
verified it on different networks and with three different update rules: the deterministic
Unconditional Imitation; a rule that allows for the presence of noise, the REP; and the
Moody Conditional Cooperation dynamics, that is based on empirical observations and
which is deeply different from the Unconditional Imitation and Replicator rules. These
interpretations of the results are further confirmed by the simulations accomplished
considering the average payoff per neighbor: in that case, indeed, the high degree
nodes lose their strength in terms of potential fitness, remaining few in number. As
a consequence, any attempt to invade the system starting from nodes of not too low
degree fails, and only for very small values of k0 some cooperators can finally survive.
Of course, further studies should explore the direction of invasion for other imitation
rules (e.g., Moran or Fermi rules, or learning algorithms) and investigate whether there
are boundary conditions for the top-down invasion process that we have reported; also
adding noise in the initial conditions, for example extracting at random from a given
distribution the exact number of invaders, will help to understand the most subtle
features of the process.
Such results can have important consequences, both theoretical (for the
understanding of the cooperative phenomena in nature) and practical ones (to manage
correctly social phenomena). Whilst the fixation probability of a pro-social mutations is
of great relevance [51], our focus in this work is on how the invasion process takes place.
The observed fact that the invasion of cooperative strategies follow a preferred top-
down direction rises questions with implications in social and biological sciences alike:
for instance, considering the vaccination campaigns in case of epidemics, the present
study suggests that in order to make the pro-social behaviors spread through a skeptic
population, it would be better to focus on few, well connected individuals than trying
to convince as many individuals as possible, with no regards to their connections, which
could turn out to be a waste of time and resources. We stress the fact that, even though
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it is practically hard for policy makers selecting all the individuals with a given number
of links, as we did in our model, the most important message that this work is that
pro-social strategies have success when they start from a group of agents which have
many connections with the external world (since it is a hierarchical process), but also
among themselves, so that they can both spread the cooperative behaviours and resist
to outer attacks.
Naturally, future studies are needed, both empirical, to confirm or deny these
findings in other contexts, and theoretical: in particular, analyzing models where the
initial invaders are selected on different basis (i.e., by considering their centrality instead
of the degree), or utilizing real networks for the simulations, could shed more light on
the details of this class of phenomena.
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